Abstract-This paper is an extended version of the earlier one, which was presented at the ETRAN 2010 conference. In this version, some theorems are proved, and several typical examples of applications of consequence relations are given. Consequence relations on propositional formulas are binary relations on propositional formulas that represent certain types of entailment -formal or semi-formal derivation of conclusion from a certain set of premises. Some of well known examples are classical implication (standard logical entailment), preference relations (i.e. relations that satisfy Reflexivity, Left logical equivalence, Right weakening, And, Or and Cautious monotonicity) rational relations (i.e. preference relations that also satisfy rational monotonicity), consequence relations (prime examples are qualitative possibilities and necessities) etc. More than two decades various consequence relations are used in automated decision making, product control, risk assessment and so on. The aim of this paper is to give a short overview of the most prominent examples of consequence relations.
INTRODUCTION
Consequence relations on formulas are binary relations on formulas that represent certain reasoning process. Some problems such as risk assessment, classification of persons/objects according to predefined criteria, finding acceptable bargain in a negotiation with contradictory demands etc. are especially suited for non-classical reasoning.
Prime examples of such reasoning processes are default reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, probabilistic and fuzzy reasoning, possibility reasoning etc.
The aim of this extended version of the paper: "Some consequence relations on propositional formulas", ETRAN 2010, is to give a short overview of some important consequence relations and to give some of the most known examples of applications of this relations.
The reason for introduction and study of this relations lies in necessity of formal description of non-monotonic reasoning. In classical logic, the set of consequences not decrease with addition of new premises. However, in practice, it is often the case that the set of consequences decrease with addition of a new knowledge. For example, if some doctor knows that his patient has a fiver, he can suspect at many different illnesses as causes. But if he is informed that his patient also has a headache, he can eliminate some illnesses which are not connected with both symptoms. Such reasoning processes, in which the set of conclusions decrease by adding of new hypotheses we call non-monotonic reasoning. Importance of descriptions of such processes lies, among the other, in constructions of expert systems and systems for automated reasoning.
There are many types of these relations that are relevant for the artificial intelligence and automated reasoning. Our choice is to present two kind of those relations: confidence relations and preference relations.
Concerning confidence relations, we will give some basic properties of comparative probabilities (historically the first example of confidence relations), and what we believe that are the prime example of confidence relations -qualitative possibilities and necessities. This belief is also reflected in the list of references -most of them are connected to the possibility theory.
Concerning preference relations, we give the standard definition of a preference relation, and the well known extension -the notion of a rational relation. A landmark in this field is the research of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor published in the early nineties. Characterization theorems of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor are listed here as well.
Finally, we have not give the precise account of the authors for mentioned contribution in terms of pointers to the list of references. However, we have try to give a name for each contributor, so it should not be difficult to divine the right reference from the given list.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The purpose of this section is to fix notation that will be used throughout the rest of the paper.
Propositional letters (propositional variables) will be denoted by p and q, indexed or primed if necessary. The set of all propositional letters will be denoted by Var. Classical propositional formulas built over the set of propositional letters Var will be denoted by α and β, indexed or primed if necessary. The set of all classical propositional formulas will be denoted by For C .
By B we will denote the Lindenbaum's propositional algebra over the set of propositional letters Var. Recall that B is the quotient set For C /~, where "~" is a congruence on propositional formulas defined by α ~ β iff α is equivalent with β. Corresponding equivalence classes will be denoted by α B . Boolean operations · (meet), + (join), c (complement) and constants 1 and 0 are defined as follows:
If R is a binary relation of For C , then R B is its image under the mapping (α, β) → (α B , β B ).
In order to formalize reasoning about consequence relations, we will extend the classical propositional language with formulas of the form (α R β) as the basic consequence formulas, and define consequence formulas as Boolean combinations of basic consequence formulas.
Consequence formulas will be denoted by ϕ and ψ , indexed or primed if necessary. The set of all consequence formulas will be denoted by For.
In order to simplify notation, for the actual binary relation R on For C , α < R β means that α R β and not β R α. Syntactically, α < R β is an abbreviation of the formula
where in this context R is a name (syntactical symbol) for a binary relation on For C .
Formally, a hyperreal number is an element of some nonarchimedean ω 1 -saturated elementary extension of the ordered field of reals. In practice, we may think of hyperreal numbers as ordinary real numbers with addition of infinitesimals and infinitely large numbers. A positive infinitesimal is a positive hyperreal number that is lesser than all positive ordinary real numbers. Existence of such objects can be easily established using the compactness theorem for the first order predicate logic.
III. CONFIDENCE RELATIONS
A binary relation R on For C is said to be a confidence relation if it has the following properties:
1. Reflexivity: α R α; 2. Linearity: α R β or β R α; 3. Transitivity: if α 1 Rα 2 and α 2 Rα 3 , then α 1 Rα 3 ; 4. Coherence with deduction: α R β whenever α implies β; 5. Nontriviality: if α is a contradiction and β is a tautology, then α < R β;
The first example of a confidence relation is a comparative probability relation, introduced by Bruno De Finetti in 1937, and exploited later by Savage in the early seventies in decision theory.
A comparative probability is a binary relation on propositional formulas that satisfies reflexivity, linearity, transitivity, nontriviality and the following three properties:
• Consistency: if α is a contradiction, then α R β for any formula β;
• Equivalence: if α R β, then α' R β', whenever α is equivalent to α' and β is equivalent to β'; • Preadditivity: if
It is easy to see that any comparative probability is a confidence relation. Indeed, preadditivity is a stronger condition than weak stability, so it only remains to verify coherence with deduction. Indeed, suppose that α implies β. Then, α ∨ β is equivalent to β, so (α ∨ β) ∧ ¬ β is a contradiction. Thus, by preadditivity,
It remains to show that α' R β' whenever β' is a tautology. Suppose that α' is an arbitrary propositional formula and that α'' is any contradiction. Then,
By consistency and equivalence, α' R β', where β' is any tautology.
More prominent examples of confidence relations are qualitative possibility and qualitative necessity relations. Those relations were introduced by Lewis in 1973, then independently defined by Dubois in 1986. The theory of possibility was extensively developed by Dubois, Prade and many others.
A qualitative possibility relation is any binary relation R on For C that satisfies reflexivity, equivalence, linearity, transitivity, nontriviality and the following two properties: 1) If α is a contradiction, then α R β for all β; 2) Disjunctive stability:
To see that any qualitative possibility is confidence relation, we need to cheek coherence with deduction and weak stability. Suppose that α implies β. Then α ∨ β is equivalent to β. From (1) we have that ⊥ R β; then, from disjunctive stability we have ( ⊥ ∨ α) R (β ∨ α). But, equivalence give us α R β. For weak stability, it is easy to see that disjunctive stability is a stronger condition.
Dually, a qualitative necessity relation is any binary relation R on For C that satisfies reflexivity, equivalence, linearity, transitivity, nontriviality and the following two dual properties:
• If α is a tautology, then β R α for all β;
• Conjunctive stability:
It is easy to see that every qualitative possibility relation R generates unique qualitative necessity relation S R by α S R β iff ¬ β R ¬ α. Indeed, suppose that α is a tautology; then ¬ α is contradiction, so ¬ α R ¬ β. Then we have β S R α. For conjunctive stability, suppose α 1 S R α 2. Then ¬ α 2 R ¬ α 1 . From disjunctive stability for R and De Morgan lows we
It is straightforward to see that S R satisfies reflexivity, equivalence, linearity, transitivity, nontriviality iff R satisfies these properties.
M. Borovcanin • Some Consequence Relations on Propositional Formulas
Moreover, any qualitative necessity relation S generates unique qualitative possibility relation R S by α R S β iff ¬ β S ¬ α. An important common feature of all confidence relations are corresponding distribution functions. Namely, a function f that maps classical propositional formulas in some linear ordering (L,≤) is a distribution function for a confidence relation R if α R β iff f(α) ≤ f(β). It is easy to show that any confidence relation has a proper class many distribution functions. Usually, the set of propositional letters is at most countable infinite, so we may restrict distribution functions to those which domain is the real unit interval [0,1].
For example, if f is a distribution function for a qualitative possibility relation R, then f(β) ). Namely, because α implies α ∨ β and β implies α ∨ β too, we have, by coherence with deduction, α R (α ∨ β) and β R (α ∨ β). From this we can conclude, from definition of distribution function, that
On the other hand, by linearity, we have αRβ or βRα. Suppose that αRβ. By disjunction stability we have (α ∨ β) R (β ∨ β), and by equivalence: (α ∨ β) R β.
From this we have:
Similarly, βRα give us: (2) and (3) we can conclude
Inequalities (1) and (4) gives :
Dually, if f is distribution function for some qualitative necessity R, then:
Proof for this assertion is analogous with the previous one.
IV. PREFERENCE RELATIONS
A preference relation is any binary relation R on the set of classical propositional formulas with the following properties:
1. Reflexivity: α R α; 2. Left logical equivalence: if α R β, then α' R β for all α' equivalent to α; 3. Right weakening: if α R β, then α R β' whenever β implies β';
4. And: if α 1 R α 2 and α 1 R α 3 , then α 1 R (α 2 ∧ α 3 ); 5. Or: if α 1 R α 3 and α 2 R α 3 , then (α 1 ∨ α 2 ) R α 3 ;
6. Cautious monotonisity: if α 1 R α 3 and α 1 R α 2 ,
The prime example of a preference relation is default relation. One of the most illustrative examples of default reasoning is Nixon's diamond. Look at next assumptions: "Usually, Quakers are pacifists"
(1) "Usually, Republicans are not pacifists" (2) "Richard Nixon is both a Quaker and a Republican (3). The problem is how a formal logic of nonmonotonic reasoning should deal with such cases. One of the possible approaches for solution of this problem is to attach priorities to assumptions. For example, the fact that "Usually, Republicans are not pacifists" can be assumed to be more likely then "Usually, Quakers are pacifists", leading to conclusion that Nixon is not a pacifist.
In 1990 Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor were give a full characterization of preference relations via preferential structures. A preferential structure is a triple (S, <, l) where:
• S is a nonempty set of states; Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor have proved that for each preference relation R exists preferential structure M such that R = R M .
A rational relation is a preference relation R on formulas that additionally satisfies the following condition also known as rational monotonicity: if α 1 R α 3 and not α 1 R ¬ α 2 , then (α 1 ∧ α 2 ) R α 3 .
Lehmann and Magidor have provided a complete characterization of rational relations in terms of hyperrealvalued conditional probabilities. Namely, for each rational relation R exists hyperreal-valued finitely additive probability measure m R such that α R β iff 1 -m R (α|β) is an infinitesimal. Recall that a > 0 is an infinitesimal iff na < 1 for every positive integer n.
V. CONCLUSION
In this short overview article we have presented several important types of consequence relations on propositional formulas that have been applied in automated reasoning for more than two decades. Consequence relations are directly connected to certain types of reasoning: beliefs, counterfactuals, default reasoning, probability reasoning etc. The present paper represent the initial stage in the development of a formal system that will formally capture majority of known consequence relations.
